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Tax Apportionment of the Income of a Unitary 
Business: An Examination of Mobil Oil Corp. v. 
Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont 
William D. Dexter* 
The United States Supreme Court, in affirming the judg- 
ment of the Vermont Supreme Court in Mobil Oil Corp. o. Com- 
missioner of Taxes of Vermont,' upheld Vermont's apportion- 
ment of Mobil's dividend income from so-called "foreign 
sources" even though these dividends constituted substantially 
all of Mobil's taxable income for the years in question, 1970-72. 
In so doing, the Court upheld the principle of full apportion- 
ment of income related to a unitary trade or business. It also 
affirmed its prior holdings that the taxpayer carries the burden 
of proving that apportionment would reach income not reasona- 
bly related to in-state sources, events, or transactions or that the 
state taxing statute as applied is otherwise invalid. The Court 
rejected the geographical "sourcing" of a unitary business' in- 
come by separate accounting and also rejected Mobil's multiple 
taxation argument. Finally, the Court gave strong support to the 
principle of worldwide combined reporting. 
The reasoning employed by the Court raises questions of vi- 
tal concern to the states and the multinational business commu- 
nity. The Court's decision turned on the resolution of procedural 
as well as substantive issues. The procedural aspects of the case, 
including the status of the record and the Mobil arguments, are 
critically important to understanding the Court's decision. The 
Court's resolution of certain substantive issues raises additional 
questions for future resolution. This Article will analyze the Mo- 
bil record, the litigants' arguments and the general configuration 
of the issues associated with state taxation of dividends and 
other income from intangibles. 
* General Counsel, Multistate Tax Commission. Asst. Attorney General, Michigan, 
1949-70. A.B., 1942, Michigan State University; LL.B., 1948, University of Michigan. 
1. 445 U.S. 425 (1980). 
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I. THE Mobil FACTS AND ARGUMENTS 
The Vermont corporate income tax is based on federal taxa- 
ble income. If a corporation's income is "derived from any trade, 
business, or activity conducted both within and without" Ver- 
mont: the statute provides for state apportionment of the cor- 
poration's federal taxable income by the generally accepted 
three-factor apportionment formula reflecting property, payroll, 
and sales. 
In filing its Vermont income tax returns for the years 1970- 
72, Mobil excluded from its apportionment base the interest, 
dividends, and foreign taxes included in its federal taxable in- 
come. It then computed its Vermont tax liability by apportion- 
ing the balance of its federal taxable income by the Vermont 
three-factor formula. On its returns, Mobil characterized its in- 
terest and dividends as "nonapportionable income" and re- 
quested administrative relief from application of the Vermont 
apportionment formula to its "unadjusted" federal taxable in- 
come. However, Mobil did not contend that the apportionment 
formula, as applied to its federal taxable income, attributed 
more net income to Vermont than was reasonably related to its 
Vermont activities and income sources. Nor did it claim that its 
dividends and stock investments were unrelated to its unitary 
business operations carried on in part in Vermont. 
The Vermont Department of Taxes recalculated Mobil's tax 
liability by including the excluded items in Mobil's apportiona- 
ble income. Mobil challenged the taxing authority's action 
before the Commissioner of Taxes. Vermont did not maintain 
that the stock and dividends were a part of Mobil's unitary 
trade or business carried on in part in Vermont. Rather, the div- 
idend exclusion was disallowed for three reasons: (1) The divi- 
dends were part of federal taxable income subject to apportion- 
ment under the Vermont statute; (2) Mobil had not established 
that the apportionment result was unreasonable; and (3) The 
"multiple risk" argument which Mobil advanced to justify the 
exclusion was not valid. 
Mobil's appeal to the Vermont courts was limited to its 
multiple-risk commerce clause argument. Presumably its argu- 
ment was so limited because Mobil concluded that prior Ver- 
mont Supreme Court decisionss foreclosed other commerce 
2. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, 8 5833 (1971). 
3. See In re Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Corporate Income Tax 1966, 1967, 1968, 
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clause and due process arguments. 
In its appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Mobil 
contended only that its so-called "foreign source" dividends 
were not apportionable. It characterized as "foreign source" in- 
come all dividends from its foreign subsidiaries and from domes- 
tic affiliates which conducted substantially all of their activities 
outside the United States. It thereby conceded that all of its 
other income (including other dividends and income from other 
intangibles) was properly includable in its apportionable income. 
Invoking the due process clause, Mobil justified the divi- 
dend exclusion on the basis that the stock was located outside 
Vermont and that all of Mobil's activities directly related to the 
stock, as well as the business activities of the payor corporations 
from which the stock dividends were derived, took place outside 
Vermont. In addition, Mobil contended that New York, its com- 
mercial domicile state, had the exclusive right to tax the divi- 
dend income under the commerce clause multiple taxation doc- 
trine. It claimed that Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los 
Angeles4 dictated this result with respect to "foreign source" 
income. 
In its reply brief, Mobil contended that the conducting of 
part of its worldwide petroleum business in connection with the 
affiliates that paid the dividends in question was irrelevant ex- 
cept in a "combined reporting" context.' It neither conceded nor 
133 Vt. 132,335 A.2d 310 (1975); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 130 Vt. 
544, 298 A.2d 839 (1972); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Morrison, 120 Vt. 324, 141 A.2d 671 (1958). 
4. 441 U.S. 434 (1979). In Japan Line, the Supreme Court invalidated an appor- 
tioned ad valorem property tax levied by the city and county of Los Angeles on cargo 
containers owned and used exclusively by foreign corporations engaged in foreign com- 
merce. The Court held that foreign commerce could not be taxed by the States in a 
manner which prevented the United States from speaking with one voice in international 
affairs or in a manner which would subject foreign commerce to multiple taxation. Mobil 
consequently argued that the Vermont apportionment of "foreign source" dividends in- 
terfered with federal international tax policy and exposed foreign commerce to prohib- 
ited multiple taxation. 
5. In a combined report, separate corporate entities conducting a unitary business 
are "combined" to determine the income tax liability of any member of the afEliated 
group. After the elimination of all afEliated transactions, including dividends, net income 
is that of the combined group; and the apportionment factors are those of the combined 
group. As pointed out by the appellant, the combined group includes only affiliated cor- 
porations in which the parent owns more than 50% of the stock. Appellant's Reply Brief, 
Appendix D a t  la. For a discussion of combined reporting, see Edison California Stores, 
Inc. v. McColgan, 30 Cal. 2d 472, 183 P.2d 16 (1947); Keesling, A Current Look at the 
Combined Report and Uniformity in Allocation Practices, 42 J .  TAX. 106 (1975). See 
also Note, Multinational Corporations and Income Allocation under Section 482 of the 
Internal Revenue Code, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1202 (1976). 
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denied that it was conducting a unitary business with any of the 
dividend payor corporations. 
Vermont asserted that Mobil's due process argument was 
frivolous because Mobil had failed to establish that its stock- 
holdings were not a part of its unitary business carried on in 
part in Vermont, or that the apportionment formula attributed 
to Vermont any income not reasonably related to Mobil's Ver- 
mont activities and sources of income. In response to Mobil's 
commerce clause multiple taxation argument, Vermont admitted 
that the commerce clause does prohibit some overlapping, multi- 
ple taxation in the net income tax area but argued that there 
was in fact no multiple taxation of Mobil's dividend income. Ad- 
ditionally, Vermont contended that the Court should not decide 
multiple taxation issues in a speculative setting and that Japan 
Line was irrelevant to the Mobil situation. 
In defining the Mobil issue, the Court explicitly noted that 
it was not considering "whether application of Vermont's 
formula produced a fair attribution of appellant's dividend in- 
come to that State";" rather, the Court confined its decision to 
the question of "whether there is something about the character 
of income earned from investments in affiliates and subsidiaries 
operating abroad that precludes, as a constitutional matter, 
state taxation of that income by the apportionment method."? 
In addressing this question, the majority found that the re- 
cord lacked detail concerning the payor corporations' activities. 
I t  nevertheless found that "from perusal of [the] documents in 
the record," many of these subsidiaries and affiliates "engage in 
business activities that form part of Mobil's integrated petro- 
leum enterpri~e.''~ While Mobil was "unwilling to concede the 
legal conclusion that these activities form part of a 'unitary busi- 
ness,' . . . it . . . offered no evidence that would undermine the 
conclusion that most, if not all, of its subsidiaries and affiliates 
contribute to [Mobil's] worldwide petroleum enterprise? Thus, 
the Court placed the burden of proof on Mobil to establish that 
6. 445 U.S. at 434. 
7 .  Id. at 435. Justice Stevens' dissent disagreed with the majority's framing of the 
issue. He argued that a challenge to the apportionable income tax base necessarily im- 
plied a challenge to the apportionment formula. Id. at 462 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
8. 445 U.S. at 435. 
9. Id. 
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the stock investments and dividends in question were dissoci- 
ated from the integrated petroleum business which Mobil con- 
ducted in part in Vermont. 
The majority opinion then considered Mobil's three pzinci- 
pal constitutional arguments: (1) No nexus existed between Ver- 
mont and Mobil's "management of its investments or the busi- 
ness activities of the payor  corporation^";^^ (2) Mobil was 
subject to multiple taxation because New York, its state of com- 
mercial domicile, could tax the dividends in full; (3) The foreign 
source of the dividends subjected Mobil to multiple taxation at 
the international level. 
A. The Due Process Issue 
The Court reaffirmed the principles that interstate com- 
merce is not immune from a fairly apportioned state income tax 
and that for a state to tax income generated in interstate com- 
merce, due process requires only "a minimal connection between 
the interstate activities and the taxing State, and a rational rela- 
tionship between the income attributed to the State and the in- 
trastate values of the enterprise."ll It further found that due 
process does not invalidate a tax simply because it is "contin- 
gent upon events brought to pass without a state . . . . -la 
Because "Mobil included all its operating income in appor- 
tionable net income, without regard to the locality in which it 
was earned,"ls the Court concluded that Mobil did not contest 
these general principles. It thus found that Mobil's due process 
nexus argument turned on the nature of dividend income as dis- 
tinguished from operating income." From Mobil's argument, the 
Court discerned only two factors that would differentiate divi- 
dend income from operating income: the foreign source of the 
income and the receipt of the income in the form of dividends.16 
The Court equated the foreign source due process argument 
with an effort by Mobil to "separately account" for its dividends 
by ascribing a geographical "source" to them. In disposing of 
this argument, the Court stated: 
10. Id. at 436. 
11. Id. at 436-37 (citations omitted). 
12. Id. at 437 (quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444-45 (1940)). 
13. Id. (emphasis added). 
14. Id. at 437-38. 
15. Id. at 438. 
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The argument that the source of the income precludes its 
taxability runs contrary to precedent. In the past, apportion- 
ability often has been challenged by the contention that in- 
come earned in one State may not be taxed in another if the 
source of the income may be ascertained by separate geograph- 
ical accounting. The Court has rejected that contention so long 
as the intrastate and extrastate activities formed part of a sin- 
gle unitary business. See Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 
501, 506-508 (1942); Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U.S. 
331, 336 (1939); cf. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S., at 272. 
In these circumstances, the Court has noted that separate ac- 
counting, while it purports to isolate portions of income re- 
ceived in various States, may fail to account for contributions 
to income resulting from functional integration, centralization 
of management, and economies of scale. Butler Bros. v. McCol- 
gan, 315 US., a t  508-509. Because these factors of profitability 
arise from the operation of the business as a whole, it becomes 
misleading to characterize the income of the business as having 
a single identifiable "source." Although separate geographical 
accounting may be useful for internal auditing, for purposes of 
state taxation it is not constitutionally required. 
The Court has applied the same rationale to businesses 
operating both here and abroad? 
The Court concluded: 
As these cases indicate, the linchpin of apportionability in 
the field of state income taxation is the unitary-business prin- 
ciple. In accord with this principle, what appellant must show, 
in order to establish that its dividend income is not subject to 
an apportioned tax in Vermont, is that the income was earned 
in the course of activities unrelated to the sale of petroleum 
16. Id. In Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942), the Court upheld the ap- 
portionment of the unitary income of Butler Brothers even though Butler Brothers had 
shown that the apportionment arrived at  a substantielly different result than its separate 
geographical accounting. I t  then held that "the results of the accounting system em- 
ployed by appellant [Butler Bros.] do not impeach the validity or propriety of the 
formula which California has applied here." Id. at 508. 
In Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U.S. 331 (1939), the Court held that, for 
Texas "net worth" franchise tax purposes, a proportional value of Ford Motor Company 
far in excess of the value of properties located in Texas by separate accounting could be 
attributed to Texas because, "[iln a unitary enterprise, property outside the state . . . 
necessarily affects the worth of the privilege within the state." Id. at  336. 
In Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978), the Court noted that apportion- 
ment, unlike separate accounting, "does not purport to identify the precise geographical 
source of a corporation's profits; rather, it is employed as a rough approximation of a 
corporation's income that is reasonably related to the activities conducted within the 
taxing State." Id. at 273. 
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products in that State? 
In disposing of the "form of dividends" argument, the Court 
rejected Mobil's contentions that its ownership or management 
of stock investments constituted a business distinct from its sale 
of petroleum products; "So long as dividends from subsidiaries 
and affiliates reflect profits derived from a functionally inte- 
grated enterprise, those dividends are income to the parent 
earned in a unitary business. One must look principally at the 
underlying activity, not at the form of investment, to determine 
the propriety of app~rtionability."~ The Court then delineated 
the scope of its holding with regard to the due process issue: 
We do not mean to suggest that all dividend income re- 
ceived by corporations operating in interstate commerce is nec- 
essarily taxable in each State where that corporation does busi- 
ness. Where the business activities of the dividend payor have 
nothing to do with the activities of the recipient in the taxing 
State, due process considerations might well preclude appor- 
tionability, because there would be no underlying unitary busi- 
ness. We need not decide, however, whether Vermont's tax 
statute would reach extraterritorial values in an instance of 
that kind. Mobil has failed to sustain its burden of proving any 
unrelated business activity on the part of its subsidiaries and 
affiliates that would raise the question of nonapportionability. 
We therefore hold that its foreign source dividends have not 
been shown to be exempt, as a matter of due process, from ap- 
portionment for state income taxation by the State of 
Vermont.'@ 
The Court thus implies a link between Vermont's power to ap- 
portion the dividends in question and the relationship of the 
payor corporations' businesses to Mobil. In its concluding state- 
ment, the majority opinion held; "Because the issue has not 
been presented, we need not, and do not, decide what the con- 
stituent elements of a fair apportionment formula applicable to 
such income would be. We hold, however, that Vermont is not 
17. 445 U.S. at 439 (emphasis added). 
18. Id. at 440. 
19. Id. at 441-42 (footnote omitted)(citations omitted). The Court rejected for lack 
of evidence Justice Stevens' dissenting argument that unrelated business activity was 
readily apparent from the record because a large number of the corporations from which 
Mobil derived significant dividend income appeared neither to be engaged in the petro- 
leum business nor to have any connection with Mobil's Vermont marketing business. Id. 
at 442 n.16. 
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precluded from taxing its proportionate share."'O This disposi- 
tion of the due process issue left several unanswered questions 
which will be considered in this Article. 
B. The Commerce Clause Issue 
The Court examined the commerce clause issue in two 
parts. First, it considered "whether there was a burden on inter- 
state commerce by virtue of the effect of the Vermont tax rela- 
tive to [Mobil's] income tax liability in other  state^."^' Second, 
the Court "determine[d] whether constitutional protections for 
foreign commerce pose additional considerations that alter the 
Although the Court "agree[d] with Mobil that the constitu- 
tionality of a Vermont tax should not depend on the vagaries of 
New York tax policy,"2s it rejected the claim that the dividend 
income in question was subject to full taxation at Mobil's com- 
mercial domicile, noting that "actual multiple taxation is not 
demonstrated on this record."24 The Court did not indicate 
whether the commerce clause limits potential multiple taxation 
or only actual multiple taxation. It simply declined to speculate 
on the power of the commercial domicile to tax dividend income 
in full: 
[Tlhere is no reason in theory why that power should be 
exclusive when the dividends reflect income from a unitary 
business, part of which is conducted in other States. In that 
situation, the income bears relation to benefits and privileges 
conferred by several States. These are the circumstances in 
which apportionment is ordinarily the accepted method.'" 
Thus, the Court declined to find multiple taxation by speculat- 
ing as to the power of the commercial domicile to tax the divi- 
dends in full, but in the process cast serious doubt on whether 
the commercial domicile had such a power. 
Ultimately, the Court refrained from clarifying the multiple 
taxation issue other than to say that such an issue would not be 
decided on the vagaries of another state's tax policy. Presurna- 
20. Id. at 449. 
21. Id. at 442. 
22. Id. at 443. 
23. Id. at  444. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 445-46. 
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bly, the Court's prior decisions are still controlling in resolving 
multiple taxation issues under the commerce clause." Those 
prior cases clearly indicate that the Supreme Court will not 
speculate about a particular state's tax system in order to re- 
solve multiple taxation issues. They also indicate that the Court 
finds nothing in the commerce clause to preclude potentially du- 
plicative taxation at the state level so long as a particular state's 
taxing system conforms to previously established standards: 
In an endeavor to establish a consistent and rational method of 
inquiry, we have examined the practical effort of a challenged 
tax to determine whether it "is applied to an activity with a 
substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, 
does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly 
related to the services provided by the State.''27 
Next, the Court addressed the question whether constitu- 
tional protections of foreign commerce posed additional 
problems. Rejecting Mobil's "forced" reliance on Japan Line," 
the Court noted that Japan Line "focused on problems of dupli- 
cative taxation on the international level,"as while Mobil in- 
volved the wholly different sphere of multiple state taxation. 
Furthermore, Japan Line involved actual multiple taxation, 
whereas Mobil involved only potential multiple taxation."O The 
Court also rejected Mobil's reliance on federal tax policy: "Con- 
current federal and state taxation of income, of course, is a well- 
established norm. Absent some explicit directive from Congress, 
we cannot infer that treatment of foreign income at  the federal 
level mandates identical treatment by the States."s1 
111. COMMENTARY ON THE Mobil DECISION 
Mo bil raises several significant questions which merit 
comment: 
26. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co., 437 U.S. 267 (1978); Washington Revenue Dep't v. 
Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734 (1978); Standard Pressed Steel Co. 
v. Department of Revenue of Wash., 419 U.S. 560 (1975); General Motors Corp. v. Wash- 
ington, 337 U.S. 436 (1964); Northwest States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 
U.S. 450 (1959). 
27. 445 U.S. at 443 (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274,279 
(1977)). 
28. See note 4 supra. 
29. 445 U.S. at 448. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
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(1) How should dividends be treated when the payors' busi- 
ness activities are neither unitary nor related to the business ac- 
tivities of the payee corporation? 
(2) How reasonable is the application of the normal three- 
factor apportionment formula (property, payroll, and sales) 
when a large portion of net income consists of dividends? 
(3) Does a "combined report" provide the constitutional 
frame of reference by which to determine the reasonableness of 
the apportionment of the unitary income of a unitary business 
carried on by more than one corporation? 
(4) Can the "commercial domicile" rule, or some other sitw 
rule, be employed to tax dividend income in full in a state even 
though that same dividend income is included in another state's 
apportionable tax base? 
Although some of the language in Mobil clouds the resolu- 
tion of these questi0ns,8~ the answers to them involve only a 
proper application of the unitary principles and apportionment 
standards previously established by the Court.ss 
A. Apportionment of Dividend Income From Unrelated 
Businesses 
Mobil does not support the proposition that the apportion- 
ability of dividend income depends upon the income being re- 
ceived from payor corporations conducting businesses related to 
the payee corporation. In disposing of the due process issue, the 
Supreme Court in Mobil predicated its decision on the relation- 
ship between Mobil's unitary operations and the business of its 
affiliated corporations from which most of the dividends in ques- 
tion were derived. It left open for future consideration the ap- 
32. For example, the dissenting opinion in Mobil is predicated on the assumption 
that the dividend income in question was held to be apportionable by the majority solely 
because Mobil was assumed to be conducting a unitary business with its affiliated corpo- 
rations. Certain language in the majority opinion may support this position. However, 
other language in the majority opinion, as well as cases relied on, supports the proposi- 
tion that the key to the apportionability of the dividends in question was Mobil's unitary 
business as a single entity. 
33. For a general analysis of the alternatives and current controversies concerning 
the attribution of income from intangible properties, see Dexter, The Business versus 
Nonbusiness Distinction Under the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act, 
10 URB. LAW. 243 (1978); Dexter, The Unitary Concept in State Income Taxation of 
Multistate-Multinational Business, 10 URB. LAW. 181 (1978); Dexter, Taxation of In- 
come from Intangibles of Multistate-Multinational Corporations, 29 VAND. L. REV. 401 
(1976); Peters, The Distinction Between Business Income and Nonbusiness Income, 
1973 So. CALIF. TAX. INST. 251. 
1071 INCOME TAX APPORTIONMENT 117 
portionability of dividends from corporations engaged in a busi- 
ness unrelated to that of the payee corporation. However, in 
upholding apportionability of the Mobil dividends, the Court 
did focus on the unitary nature of Mobil's business as a single 
entity and relied on decisions which upheld apportionability on 
the basis of the unitary nature of a corporation. It did not dis- 
tinguish dividends from any other type of income, and it de- 
clined to "source" the dividend income to the underlying activi- 
ties of the payor corporations. 
While the Court considered the due process issue separately 
from the multiple-taxation commerce clause issue, its analysis of 
Mobil's multiple-taxation argument is relevant in resolving the 
due process issue. The Court implied that intangible property 
may be related to a taxpayer's activities in more than one juris- 
diction? "Even for property or franchise taxes, apportionment 
of intangible values is not u n k n o ~ n . " ~ ~  In connection with the 
multiple-taxation issue it noted that, 
There is no reason in theory why that power [power of the 
state of commercial doinicile to tax the dividend income] 
should be exclusive when the dividends reflect income from a 
unitary business, part of which is conducted in other States. In 
that situation, the income bears relation to benefits and privi- 
leges conferred by several States. These are the circumstances 
in which apportionment is ordinarily the accepted methocP6 
Because of an absence of proof, the Court did not have to 
determine the apportionability of dividend income from corpo- 
rations not conducting a business related to that of Mobil. But it 
is of interest to note that even Justice Stevens, in his dissent, 
justified apportionment of investment income in some instances: 
We may assume that there are cases in which it would be 
appropriate to regard modest amounts of investment income as 
an incidental part of a company's overall operations and to al- 
locate it between the taxing State and other jurisdictions on 
the basis of the same factors as are used to allocate operating 
Apparently he would support the apportionment of income from 
working-capital investments in stock and other securities which 
34. 445 U.S. at 445. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 445-46. 
37. Id. a t  458 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(footnote omitted). 
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would constitute business income under section l(a) of the Uni- 
form Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA). Busi- 
ness income is there defined as income from property which is 
acquired, managed, or disposed of as integral parts of the tax- 
payer's regular trade or business  operation^.^^ 
A footnote in Mobil's majority opinion implied that the due 
process tie-in of Mobil's dividends to its Vermont activities was 
dependent upon whether the dividend-payor corporations were 
engaged in an activity related to Mobil's petroleum business.se 
Ultimately, however, the majority stated that it did not reach 
the issue of apportionability of dividend income "where the bus- 
iness activities of the dividend payor have nothing to do with 
the activities of the recipient in the taxing State . . . . ,940 
The controlling question was whether the stock investments 
were made in connection with, and were related to, the unitary 
business of the recipient of the dividends. The Supreme Court's 
unitary decisions, including those relied on in Mobil, indicate 
that this question is determinative of the issue." All of these 
unitary cases dealt with the unity of a single corporation and 
upheld the apportionment of the entire property, value, or in- 
come attributable to, or arising in connection with, the opera- 
tions of a single unitary corporate entity." There is nothing in 
38. UNIFORM DIVISION OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT $ l(a), reprinted in 9(a) 
UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 448. 
39. 445 U.S. a t  442 n.16. 
40. Id. a t  442. 
41. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980); 
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978); Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 
(1942); Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U.S. 331 (1939); Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. 
North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931); Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271 (1924); Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 
(1920); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911); Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State 
Auditor, 165 U.S. 194 (1896), afd on rehearing, 166 U.S. 185 (1897). 
42. A number of state income tax cases have applied the unitary concept to a single 
corporation in determining the apportionability of income from intangibles. See, e.g., 
International Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435 (1944); Wis- 
consin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940); Qualls v. Montgomery Ward, & Co., 266 
Ark. 207, 585 S.W.2d 18 (1979); John Deere Plow Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 38 Cal. 2d 
214, 238 P.2d 569 (1951), appeal dismissed, 343 U.S. 939 (1952); American Smelting & 
Ref. Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 99 Idaho 924,592 P.2d 39 (1979), vacated, 445 U.S. 
939 (1980), reinstated, 624 P.2d 946 (Idaho 1981) (No. 80-2015); Albany Int'l Corp. v. 
Halperin, 388 A.2d 902 (We. 1978); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 393 
N.E.2d 330 (Mass. 1979); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 276 
Minn. 479,151 N.W.2d 294 (1967); Great Lakes Pipe Line Co. v. Commissioner of Taxa- 
tion, 272 Minn. 403, 138 N.W.2d 612 (1965), appeal dismissed, 384 U.S. 718 (1966); 
Montana Dep't of Revenue v. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 173 Mont. 316, 567 P.2d 
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Mobil that conflicts with these holdings. 
Also, Mobil did not distinguish dividends from other income 
for constitutional purposes. Therefore, the same considerations 
were used to determine the apportionability of dividend income 
as are applied to determine the apportionability of any other 
class of income, i.e., whether the income is derived from invest- 
ments made in connection with the taxpayer's unitary business. 
When examining Mobil's relationship to the payor corpora- 
tions, Mobil implicitly recognized the distinction between taxing 
the profits of the payor corporations and taxing the income of 
Mobil which was attributable solely to its business operations. 
Otherwise, it could not have found that dividends had a domes- 
tic source for income attribution purposes.4a 
In other words, apart from the unitary ties between the bus- 
iness of a parent payee corporation and that of its a l i a ted  
payor corporations, there can exist a relationship between the 
stock investments and the business of the payee corporation 
which is sufficient alone to justify the apportionment of dividend 
income. The key question, as to due process apportionability 
901 (1977), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 1042 (1978); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Director of 
Div. of Taxation, 45 N.J. 466, 213 A.2d 1 (1965); Champion Int'l Corp. v. Bureau of 
Revenue, 88 N.M. 411,540 P.2d 1300 (1975); Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Department of 
Revenue, 270 Or. 329,527 P.2d 729 (1974); In re Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Corporate 
Income Tax 1966, 1967, 1968, 133 Vt. 132, 335 A.2d 310 (1975); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. 
Commissioner of Taxes, 130 Vt. 544,298 A.2d 839 (1972); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Morrison, 120 
Vt. 324, 141 A.2d 671 (1958). 
43. In this connection, In re Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Corporate Income Tax 
1966, 1967, 1968, 133 Vt. 132, 336 A.2d 310 (1975), is instructive: 
Goodyear's constitutional argument rests on its allegations that its extra- 
territorial values are being taxed. This allegation, however, fails to distinguish 
the foreign dividend income that Goodyear receives from its subsidiaries from 
the profits those subsidiaries realize from their own business activities con- 
ducted without the borders of Vermont. The right to receive dividends is inci- 
dent to the ownership of stock. 
. . . . 
The failure of the county court to make a finding on the issue of whether 
Goodyear's subsidiaries were operated aa separate entities does not constitute 
error because of the lack of relevance such a finding has to the taxation of 
foreign dividend income. Vermont's corporate income tax does not seek to tax 
the profits realized from the business activities of Goodyear's subsidiaries con- 
ducted without the borders of Vermont. I t  is taxing only the dividend income 
realized by Goodyear itself. 
133 Vt. at 134-35, 335 A.2d at  311-12 (citations omitted). 
See also American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 99 Idaho 924, 
592 P.2d 39 (1979), vacated, 446 U.S. 939 (1980), reinstated, 624 P.2d 946 (Idaho 1981) 
(No. 80-2015); Square D Co. v. Kentucky Bd. of Tax Appeals, 415 S.W.2d 594 (Ky. 
1967); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Clayton, 267 N.C. 97, 147 S.E.2d 552 (1966). 
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within the rationale of Mobil, is whether the income is derived 
in connection with a unitary trade or business which the tax- 
payer carries on in part in the taxing state. This does not mean 
that the relationship of the payor corporation's business to the 
payee taxpayer's business is irrelevant in determining whether 
the income is to be included in the taxpayer's apportionable tax 
base. A taxpayer might make an investment in the stock of an- 
other corporation to obtain a market for its product or a source 
of supplies. Such considerations would be relevant in determin- 
ing the relationship of an investment to the business of the tax- 
payer carried on in part in the taxing state. 
There is thus no reason to conclude that Mobil would limit 
the apportionability of dividends to only those cases or circum- 
stances where the payor corporation and payee corporation are 
engaged in related business activities. The issue is whether the 
stock is held by the payee for a unitary business purpose. This is 
supported by the fact that the Court upheld the apportionment 
of Mobil's ARAMCO dividends even though Mobil owned only a 
ten percent stock interest-precluding combined reporting 
based on the ownership test. Inasmuch as Mobil's investment in 
ARAMCO stock assured it of a supply of crude oil for its petro- 
leum business, ARAMCO dividends are clearly apportionable 
because Mobil's ARAMCO stock investment is related to its pe- 
troleum business.44 Thus, nothing in Mobil would invalidate the 
apportionment of dividends as business income as defined in 
section l(a) of the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes 
Act (UDITPA) .46 
In sum, Mobil supports the proposition that all net income 
derived from stock and other investments made in connection 
with the payee's unitary operations is subject to apportion- 
ment.46 As held in Mobil, the focal point of income apportion- 
44. For another example, most of the corporations listed in the dissent as not in the 
same kind of business as Mobil and not controlled by Mobil are public utilities. If Mobil 
made investments in the stock of those corporations to ensure sources of energy for Mo- 
bil's petroleum business, there would be a sufficient relationship between such stock in- 
vestments and Mobil's petroleum business to support apportionability of dividends re- 
ceived by Mobil from these investments within the purview of Mobil. We do not here 
mean to suggest that the ultimate due process test may require more than the reason- 
ableness of an apportionment result. 
45. Section l(a) of UDITPA, as illustrated by Montana Dep't of Revenue v. Ameri- 
can Smelting & Ref. Co., 173 Mont. 316,567 P.2d 901 (1977), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 
1042 (1978), simply requires a tie-in between the taxpayer's unitary business operations 
and its stock investments from which dividends are derived. 
46. Given the history of the taxation of intangibles, the abstract nature of a net 
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ability is the unitary business principle. 
B. Modification of an Apportionment Formula 
The second unresolved issue raised by Mobil is the validity 
of the three-factor apportionment formula (sales, tangible prop- 
erty, and payroll) when large amounts of dividends or other in- 
come from intangible properties are included in apportionable 
income. As long as the taxpayer has not established by clear and 
cogent evidence that an apportionment formula reaches extra- 
territorial income or values, Mobil does not require the appor- 
income tax, the lack of any fixed situs for intangible properties, and the fact that appor- 
tionment does not attempt to "source" income to any situs, this interpretation of Mobil 
is amply justified. An examination of some of the abstract considerations involved in the 
attribution of intangibles for state taxation purposes supports this interpretation. 
The first consideration is the abstract nature of a tax on net income. By its very 
nature, a net income tax is imposed upon an intangible concept. It is not a direct tax on 
intangibles or their ownership; nor is it a tax on gross receipts or property per se. It is an 
abstract concept derived from the operational events pertaining to the taxpayer within a 
limited time frame called a tax year. See, e.g., Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 
(1911); New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937). Compare Peck & Co. v. 
Lowe, 247 U.S. 165 (1918) with Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U.S. 292 (1917). In 
Cohn, in divorcing the taxation of income from the taxable situs of the land producing 
the income, the Court stated, "Neither the privilege nor the burden is affected by the 
character of the source from which the income is derived." The fact that the taxation of 
net income is not the taxation of any particular component from which net income is 
derived is illustrated by comparison of Crew Levick with Peck. While the Supreme Court 
in Crew Levick invalidated a state gross receipts tax on receipts from goods sold in for- 
eign commerce under the import-export clause, in Peck it rejected the argument that a 
tax on net income from export sales constituted a tax on exports. In so doing, it held 
that an income tax 
is not laid on income from exportation because of its source . . . . The tax is 
levied after exportation is completed, after all expenses are paid and losses 
adjusted, and after the recipient of the income is free to use it as he chooses. 
Thus, what is taxed-the net income-is as far removed from exportation as 
are articles intended for export before the exportation begins. 
247 U.S. at 174-75. 
The second consideration is the abstract nature of the source from which income 
from intangibles is derived. For example, the dividend income in Mobil could conceiva- 
bly be "sourced" to Mobil's ownership of the underlying stock, to its limited manage- 
ment of the stock, to the activities of the afliliated corporations from which the divi- 
dends were derived, to Mobil's commercial domicile, to its legal domicile, or to Mobil's 
management of its worldwide petroleum business. 
The third consideration is the abstract nature of an apportionment formula. The use 
of such a formula is justified on the basis that it is not possible to identify the true 
source of net income apart from the totality of the income-producing elements of a tax- 
payer's trade or business operations. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 US. 267 (1978). 
These factors lend strong support to the proposition that intangibles, and income 
derived therefrom, should be apportioned among those states in which the taxpayer con- 
ducts business related to the intangibles. They support the Mobil principle that all in- 
come related to a unitary business should be subject to apportionment. 
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tionment formula to be modified. 
Because Vermont did not permit combined reporting4' of 
Mobil and its subsidiaries, and because the Supreme Court did 
not find the Vermont apportionment result invalid per se, one 
may conclude that application of the apportionment formula is 
appropriate under assumed Mobil facts unless it can be estab- 
lished by clear and cogent evidence that extraterritorial taxation 
results. Mobil demonstrates that the unreasonableness of an ap- 
portionment formula cannot be established by merely showing 
that the income subject to apportionment includes large 
amounts of income from intangibles. 
However, the Court at least implied that some type of ad- 
justment, including combined reporting, may have been appro- 
priate under the assumed Mobil facts. The Court also implied 
that there may be some link between the apportionability of div- 
idend income and the underlying activities of the payor corpora- 
tions when they conduct a unitary business with the payee cor- 
poration. This raises the question of what type of apportionment 
relief, if any, the taxpayer is entitled to if substantial amounts of 
apportionable income are from stock investments in subsidiary 
corporations which conduct a unitary business with the 
taxpayer. 
Since the Court held that this issue was not properly before 
it, Mobil sheds little light on the problem. The Court did indi- 
cate that Vermont is not precluded from taxing its proportionate 
share of Mobil's dividend income48 and further suggested that 
combined reporting results may be constitutionally relevant.4s 
Also, in discussing the multiple taxation issue, the Court ap- 
peared to reject the notion that the commercial domicile state is 
entitled to tax in full the income from intangible properties: 
Although we do not now presume to pass on the constitutional- 
47. Combined reporting is merely an extension of the well-recognized unitary princi- 
ple. See, e.g., Edison California Stores, Inc. v. McColgan, 30 Cal. 2d 472, 183 P.2d 16 
(1947); American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 99 Idaho 924, 592 
P.2d x9- (1979), vacated, 445 U.S. 939 (1980), reinstated, 624 P.2d 946 (Idaho 1981) (No. 
80-2015); Montana Dep't of Revenue v. American Smelting & Ref, Co., 173 Mont. 316, 
567 ~.$d 901 (1977), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 1042 (1978); Coca Cola Co. v. Depart- 
ment of Revenue, 271 Or. 517, 533 P.2d 788 (1975). There is thus no reason why it 
should not be generally allowed by all the states. In fact, Mobil may, in some cases, 
mandate combined reporting to achieve a fair apportionment. See text accompanying 
notes 62-65 infra. 
48. 445 U.S. at 449. 
49. Id. a t  441 11.15. 
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ity of a hypothetical New York tax, we may assume, for pre- 
sent purposes, that the State of commercial domicile has the 
authority to lay some tax on appellant's dividend income as 
well as on the value of its stock. But there is no reason in the- 
ory why that power should be exclusive when the dividends re- 
fled income from a unitary business, part of which is con- 
ducted in other States. In that situation, the income bears 
relation to benefits and privileges conferred by several States. 
These are the circumstances in which apportionment is ordina- 
rily the accepted method. Since Vermont seeks to tax income, 
not ownership, we hold that its interest in taxing a proportion- 
ate share of appellant's dividend income is not overridden by 
any interest of the State of commercial d~rnic i le .~~ 
Further, the Mobil Court noted: 
Even for property or franchise taxes, apportionment of intangi- 
ble values is not unknown. See Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 
308 U.S. at  335-336; Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 
165 U.S. 194 (1896), aff'd on rehearing, 166 U.S. 185, 222 
(1897). Moreover, cases upholding allocation to a single situs 
for property tax purposes have distinguished income tax situa- 
tions where the apportionment principle prevails. See Whelling 
Steel Corp. u. Fox, 298 U.S., at 212F 
In light of the Court's pronouncements in Mobil and other 
tax base attribution cases and granted the proposition that in- 
come from intangible properties is subject to taxation by more 
than one state, resolution of the reasonable apportionment issue 
is dependent on the competing claims of states for their propor- 
tionate share of such income. This, in turn, is necessarily depen- 
dent upon the activities or sources to which the income from 
intangible properties should be attributed. If, as contended by 
Mobil, dividend income and income from other intangible prop- 
erty is attributable solely to the states where certain activities 
50. Id. at 445. 
51. Id. at 445. In Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 US. 331 (1939)' the Court 
upheld the apportionment of the net worth of Ford Motor Company for Texas franchise 
tax purposes without considering the commercial domicile's interests. In Adam Express 
Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 166 U.S. 185 (1897), the Court upheld the apportionment, by 
a tangible property factor, of the entire intangibles and going-concern values of the Ex- 
press Company for ad valorem property tax purposes. In Whelling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 
298 US. 193 (1936), the Court, in upholding the commercial domicile's right to tax in- 
tangibles for ad valorem property tax purposes on "business situs" principles, clearly 
distinguished the attribution of net income based on apportionment principles. This dis- 
tinction was made in response to the argument that the intangibles involved arose out of 
Wheeling Steel's activities in several states. 
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concerning those types of investments and income are carried 
on, only those states would be entitled to any share of such in- 
come. The Court, however, rejected this argument. It also appar- 
ently rejected the argument that the commercial domicile had a 
special claim to the taxation of dividend income. It upheld full 
apportionment of income from intangible properties if derived 
in connection with the taxpayer's unitary business operations. 
Therefore, there is no reason to favor the commercial domicile. 
The difficulty created by Mobil is the Court's identification 
of dividend income with the business activities of the payor cor- 
porations. One cannot ignore the fact that Mobil is a separate 
and distinct taxpayer from the payor corporationss2 and that the 
taxation of dividends is distinct and separate from the taxation 
of the underlying profits of the payor  corporation^.^ If the state 
of commercial domicile is not entitled to tax dividend income in 
full to the exclusion of the states in which the taxpayer's unitary 
business is carried on, and if dividend income is not to be attrib- 
utable to the activities of the payor corporations, the only other 
logical alternative is to apportion the dividends on the basis of 
the income-producing activities of the payee corporation. Since 
Mobil's dividends were received from stocks held in connection 
with the petroleum operations of Mobil as a separate entity, and 
since the three-factor apportionment formula assigns all income 
on the basis of the underlying business activities of the payee 
corporation, there seems to be little logic in assigning dividend 
income or other income from intangible properties on any other 
basis. By their very nature, intangible properties and the income 
therefrom have no fixed situs or location apart from where the 
52. Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943). 
53. In American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 99 Idaho 924,592 
P.2d 39 (1979), vacated, 445 U.S. 939 (1980), reinstated, 624 P.2d 946 (Idaho 1981) (No. 
80-2015); In  re Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Corporate Income Tax 1966, 1967, 1968, 
133 Vt. 132, 335 A.2d 310 (1975), and Gulf Oil Corp. v. Morrison, 120 Vt. 324, 141 A.2d 
671 (1958), the courts treated the ownership of stock in subsidiaries and the income 
derived therefrom as being distinct from the operations and properties of the subsidiary 
payor corporations. These cases therefore concluded that the inclusion of dividends from 
affiliates in apportionable income did not require any modification of an apportionment 
formula unless the taxpayer could establish by clear and cogent evidence that the 
formula reached extraterritorial income. But see Square D Co. v. Kentucky Bd. of Tax 
Appeals, 415 S.W.2d 594 (Ky. 1967), and American Bakeries Co. v. Johnson, 259 N.C. 
419, 131 S.E.2d 1 (1963), which keyed the apportionability of dividends upon the rela- 
tionship of the subsidiary-payor corporations' businesses to the business of the payee- 
parent corporation. Dividends were identified with the in-state business of the taxpayer- 
payee corporation and thus subject to apportionment if derived from payor corporations 
conducting a unitary business with the payee corporation. 
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underlying activities of the owner corporation are carried on.& 
Where stock is held in connection with business conducted 
by the payee in several states, to give any particular state a spe- 
cial claim to dividend income or to income from other in- 
tangibles attributes that income by application of separate ac- 
counting rather than by apportionment principles. Furthermore, 
the three-factor apportionment formula takes into account 
where dividend income is received and where the taxpayer car- 
ries on any activities pertaining to it. The extent to which Mobil 
employed people, utilized tangible personal property, and re- 
ceived dividend income in New York was reflected in the prop- 
erty, payroll, and sales factors of Vermont's apportionment 
formula. The only additional issue is whether New York is enti- 
tled to any special factor adjustments varying the normal three- 
factor formula. Mobil does not suggest any special adjustments. 
Where a corporate business maintains investments as part 
of its business and uses those investments and the income de- 
rived therefrom in its overall business operations, each state in 
which the corporation conducts those operations has a legitimate 
claim to tax its share of that income. Since the standard appor- 
tionment formula produces the most reasonable and equitable 
result, it is the appropriate means by which to determine each 
state's share. The result is consistent with the principle of ap- 
portionability; the formula divides the income associated with 
the totality of the taxpayer's trade or business operations among 
the states where the taxpayer conducts those operations. 
The taxpayer may rebut the reasonableness of an appor- 
tionment formula by meeting its burden of showing by clear and 
cogent evidence that the apportionment formula is unreasona- 
ble.66 Under this standard, it was incumbent upon Mobil to es- 
tablish that the apportionment result attributed more income to 
Vermont than the portion of Mobil's income reasonably attribu- 
table to its Vermont sources and act ivi t ie~.~ Mobil holds that 
this burden is not met by the taxpayer's attributing part of its 
apportionable income to particular sources or situses. One can 
54. Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939). 
55. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. North 
Carolina, 297 U.S. 682 (1936). 
56. Given the abstract nature of net income, the inability to locate intangibles in a 
geographical sense, and the irrelevancy of geographical source concepts to apportion- 
ability, the unitary principle-held to constitute the linchpin of apportionability in Mo- 
biz-should control the reasonableness of apportionability for both tax base and reasona- 
ble apportionment purposes. 
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only speculate as to what kind of factual showing Mobil could 
have made to demonstrate that the Vermont apportionment 
formula actually taxed any extraterritorial income of Mobil-or 
whether such a showing is even possible. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, one cannot totally escape 
the fact that the Court did indicate that the dividend income 
was related to the underlying business activities of Mobil and its 
subsidiary corporations because the unitary business of Mobil 
was presumed to be conducted in part by its affiliated corpora- 
tions. The Court specified that an apportionment formula 
should take this into account. This is not an illogical premise?' 
In an integrated unitary business, conducted in part through 
subsidiary and affiliated corporations, dividend income received 
by the parent from its controlled affiliated corporations may in 
substance be more akin to operating income than to income 
from the unitary ownership and management of the stock. 
Granted the premise that the unitary business is the true 
source of the dividend income, it is reasonable to conclude that 
the apportionment of this dividend income is entitled to special 
consideration. However, this special consideration does not re- 
quire the inclusion of the stock value in the property factor and 
the attribution of this value to the commercial domicile, because 
there is no congruence between the place of the underlying busi- 
ness activities of the payor corporations and the commercial 
domicile of the payee corporation. Nor does it require a modifi- 
cation of the apportionment formula for the attribution of any 
income other than dividend income, because the underlying ac- 
tivities of the dividend payor corporations are irrelevant to the 
attribution of any income other than dividends. 
One suggested adjustment would modify the formula by giv- 
ing weight to the properties the payor corporations utilized to 
produce the dividend income. This would be done by including 
in the formula the tangible properties of each payor corporation 
in the ratio that its dividends bear to its total profits for the 
year in question. For example, if subsidiary "X" had earnings 
and profits of $1,000 for the tax year and tangible property of 
$10,000, and the dividends that the parent "Y" received from 
57. Combined reporting is based on the assumption that a reasonable apportion- 
ment of the income of any member of a commonly owned and controlled group of corpo- 
rations carrying on a unitary business can be achieved only by combining the group's 
income and apportionment factors. See, e.g., Edison California Stores, Inc. v. McColgan, 
30 Cal. 2d 472, 183 P.2d 16 (1947). 
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"X" amounted to $500, the denominator of the property factor 
would be modified to include $5,000 of the property of "X" 
when apportioning the dividend income that "Y" received from 
"X". 
In substance this adjustment would attribute the value of 
the stock to the location of the underlying tangible property 
which gave rise to the dividend income. A similar adjustment 
was made in Adam Express Co. u. Ohio State AuditoF for the 
attribution of intangible properties for ad valorem property tax 
purposes. This modification is also consistent with the appor- 
tionment of unitary income under the property factor apportion- 
ment formulas upheld in Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Cham- 
berlain," Bass, Ratcliffe & Greeton, Ltd. u. State Tax 
Commiss i~n ,~~  and Maxwell u. Kent-Coffey Mfg. CO.~' Such a 
modification should be held constitutional even though the 
payor corporations and the payee corporation are to be treated 
as a single entity for dividend income attribution purposes. 
The other formula factors could also be modified. However, 
the need to modify the property factor arises from the exclusion 
of intangible properties from this factor. There is no comparable 
reason to modify the other factors. Thus, attribution of the in- 
tangible properties based on the location of the payor corpora- 
tions' tangible properties should be a sufficient constitutional 
adjustment of the apportionment formula if Mobil requires one. 
Also, consistent with the Mobil rationale, combined report- 
ing results should satisfy any constitutional apportionment re- 
quirements and could be used as a reference in determining the 
reasonableness of the apportionment results reached in states 
that do not allow combined reporting. A combined report takes 
into account the total unitary income and all the apportionment 
factors of a commonly owned and controlled unitary group. Cer- 
tainly combined reporting results would conform to the unitary 
principles a r m e d  by the Mobil Court. For example, in report- 
ing to Vermont for open years not involved in the Mobil case, 
can Mobil obtain modification of the three-factor formula by 
showing-without reference to combined reporting results-that 
Vermont has taxed extraterritorial income? Based on the Mobil 
rationale, it is doubtful that Mobil could do so. 
58. 166 U.S. 185 (1897). 
59. 254 U.S. 113 (1920). 
60. 266 U.S. 271 (1924). 
61. 204 N.C. 365, 168 S.E. 397 (1933), afd, 291 US. 642 (1934). 
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In sum, Mobil may require a modification of the three-fac- 
tor apportionment formula where apportionable income includes 
substantial dividends derived from corporations conducting a 
unitary business with the taxpayer. Any modification should be 
limited to the attribution of dividends. This modification may 
require an apportionment result in proportion to the result ob- 
tained by a combined report. It can be accomplished by adjust- 
ing one or more of the apportionment factors to include the 
payor corporation's factors in the ratio that the dividends bear 
to the payor corporation's total net income for the year in ques- 
tion. The modification can also be made by permitting a com- 
bined report, or by comparing combined report results to the ap- 
portionment formula results, to determine the reasonableness of 
the formula. Apart from the foregoing, there is no reason why an 
apportionment formula should be modified simply because in- 
come from intangibles is included in apportionable income. If 
such income is apportionable, it is because that income, as well 
as all other apportionable income, is attributable to the location 
where the taxpayer's trade or business is carried on. 
C. The Relevance of Combined Reporting Results 
The third question raised by Mobil is whether combined re- 
porting prescribes the constitutional limits of apportionability of 
the income of a member of an affiliated group of corporations 
conducting a unitary trade or business. This question is closely 
associated with the need to modify an apportionment formula to 
reach a constitutional result. Although the Mobil Court did not 
pass upon this question because of Mobil's failure to challenge 
the validity of the Vermont apportionment formula, it did sug- 
gest that the results achieved by combined reporting might re- 
present an appropriate constitutional limitati~n.~" 
In light of the fact that most multistate-multinational cor- 
porations oppose combined reporting and the majority of the 
states do not utilize it, the Mobil comments on combined report- 
ing are indeed interesting. Combined reporting is clearly sup- 
ported by Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion. In addition, it is 
advocated by the Multistate Tax Commission. Further support 
for use of a combined report to reach reasonable apportionment 
results is found in a series of combined reporting cases beginning 
62. 445 U.S. at 441 11.15. 
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with Edison California Stores, Inc. v. M ~ C o l g a n . ~ ~  These cases 
are based on the premise that combined reporting is required to 
effect a reasonable apportionment of the income of a unitary 
business carried on by two or more commonly owned and con- 
trolled corporations. Mobil supports this principle: 
Superficially, intercorporate division might appear to be a 
more attractive basis for limiting apportionability. But the 
form of business organization may have nothing to do with the 
underlying unity or diversity of business enterprise. Had appel- 
lant chosen to operate its foreign subsidiaries as separate divi- 
sions of a legally as well as a functionally integrated enterprise, 
there is little doubt that the income derived from those divi- 
sions would meet due process requirements for appor- 
ti~nability.~~ 
Stated otherwise, the Court attached no significance to the form 
in which a unitary business is conducted. 
Certainly, Mobil permits a taxpayer to argue the unreasona- 
bleness of an apportionment formula by reference to a combined 
report result. Mobil would also support a tax administrator's ar- 
gument that an apportionment formula reaches a fair result if it 
does not materially exceed combined reporting results. In the re- 
cent case of Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Lenckos," the Illinois Su- 
preme Court held that a combined report was necessary to prop- 
erly reflect the income of a unitary business carried on by 
Caterpillar and its subsidiary corporations in Illinois. 
Thus, although the Mobil Court did not have the issue of 
the validity of combined reporting before it, in light of the fore- 
going, Mobil may be cited for the proposition that worldwide 
combined reporting is a constitutionally approved method for 
income attribution of a multinational business conducted in part 
by affiliated foreign corporations. 
D. The Commercial Domicile's Power to Tax Dividends 
Mobil does not support the position that the commercial 
domicile can tax more than its apportioned share of dividends 
related to a unitary business. While the Court refused to specu- 
late on the commercial domicile's constitutional power to tax 
Mobil's dividends in full, it did hold that the commercial domi- 
63. 30 Cal. 2d 472, 183 P.2d 16 (1947). 
64. 445 U.S. at 440-41. 
65. Nos. 58218, 52828, and 52903 (Ill. Feb. 20, 1981). 
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cile's power to tax dividends did not foreclose the apportion- 
ability of dividends and the power of other states to tax their 
appropriate share of dividend income. It also stated, "[Wle may 
assume, for present purposes, that the State of commercial dom- 
icile has the authority to lay some tax on appellant's [Mobil's] 
dividend income as well as on the value of its stock? Further- 
more, the Court noted: 
Taxation by apportionment and taxation by allocation to a 
single situs are theoretically incommensurate, and if the latter 
method is constitutionally preferred, a tax based on the former 
cannot be sustained. We find no adequate justification, how- 
ever, for such a preference. Although a fictionalized situs for 
intangible property sometimes has been invoked to avoid mul- 
tiple taxation of ownership, there is nothing talismanic about 
the concepts of "business situs" or "commercial domicile" that 
automatically renders those concepts applicable when taxation 
of income from intangibles is at issue. . . . 
The reasons for allocation to a single situs that often apply 
in the case of property taxation carry little force in the present 
context.67 
From the foregoing language, one can only speculate as to 
whether dividends derived from and utilized in an integrated 
business can be taxed in full by the domiciliary state. However, 
in light of recent ad valorem property tax cases pertaining to the 
taxation of movable tangible p r~pe r ty ,~  the Court's historical 
treatment of intangibles for net worth and property tax pur- 
poses:@ and the Court's inclination to prevent actual multiple 
taxation, there is a strong inference that the commercial domi- 
cile does not have the constitutional authority to tax such divi- 
dends in full. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Mobil represents a substantial victory for the principle of 
full apportionment of the unitary income of a unitary trade or 
business in accordance with the apportionment standards devel- 
66. 445 U.S. at 445. 
67. Id. at 444-45 (citation omitted). 
68. See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angela, 441 U.S. 434 (1979); Braniff 
Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equalization and Assessment, 347 U.S. 590 
(1954); Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952). 
69. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U.S. 331 (1939); Adam Express 
Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 166 U.S. 185 (1897). 
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oped by the Supreme Court. Although some of the Mobil lan- 
guage employed in resolving the due process issue seems to indi- 
cate that dividend income from subsidiary and affiliated 
corporations is subject to apportionment only if the activities of 
the payor corporations are in some way integrated with the par- 
ent corporation's unitary business, there is nothing in the under- 
lying rationale that detracts from the proposition that all income 
related to the conduct of a unitary trade or business, irrespective 
of its nature or source, is subject to fair apportionment among 
the states. Both the Court's conclusion that the unitary concept 
is the linchpin of apportionability and the cases the Court relied 
on specifically support this proposition. 
Although Mobil raised the question of the reasonableness of 
an apportionment formula which does not include intangible 
properties or the payor corporations' underlying activities in the 
apportionment factors, there is nothing to indicate that the Ver- 
mont formula taxed any extraterritorial income of Mobil. The 
majority in Mobil, unlike the dissent, did not find anything inva- 
lid per se in the Vermont apportionment formula. This was true 
even though substantially all of the apportionable income in 
Mobil's Vermont tax base consisted of so-called "foreign source" 
dividend income from payor corporations which did not conduct 
activities in Vermont and which were engaged in a business sim- 
ilar to that of Mobil. 
In resolving the multiple taxation issue, the Court reaf- 
firmed the principle of full apportionment of unitary trade or 
business income. It denied Mobil's claim that the commercial 
domicile had any special claim, apart from unitary principles, to 
tax dividend income. In addition, it affirmed the proposition 
that the boundary of a unitary business can include the business 
affairs of a group of commonly owned and controlled affiliated 
corporations; it even suggested that it might be necessary to so 
define a unitary business to arrive at a constitutional apportion- 
ment of the income of a member of an d l i a t ed  group con- 
ducting a unitary business. 
There is nothing in Mobil to support the argument that div- 
idends and other income from intangible properties are not ap- 
portionable in conformity with unitary principles on the same 
basis as any other income. The Court recognized that a tax on 
net income applies to an abstract concept, unlike ad valorem 
property taxes, and that dividends and other receipts forming 
part of unitary net ,income cannot be subject to distinct sourcing 
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rules. 
Furthermore, there is nothing in Mobil to lighten the bur- 
den of proof on a taxpayer attempting to establish the invalidity 
of an apportionment formula or to dissociate properties and in- 
come from the taxpayer's unitary business operations. Given the 
abstract nature of net income, intangible properties, and appor- 
tionment results, the taxpayer's burden is quite heavy. 
When the incidents of ownership of intangibles are exer- 
cised by the taxpayer in furtherance of its business-which is 
generally the case in regard to multistate-multinational corpora- 
tions-income from intangible sources should be distributed 
"wherever . . . its work is done.'''O This is accomplished by ap- 
plication of the standard apportionment formula, which takes 
into account the location of the taxpayer's property, payroll and 
sales. 
Because the Supreme Court considered the unitary relation- 
ship between Mobil and its affiliated corporations, because the 
Court declined to pass on the reasonableness of the Vermont ap- 
portionment formula, and because of its reference to combined 
reporting, Mobil would leave serious questions unanswered if the 
case were viewed apart from prior unitary and apportionment 
decisions. Fortunately, these issues have been properly dealt 
with in the Supreme Court's prior decisions. 
The only reasonable answer to taxpayer complaints is the 
insistence upon full apportionment, by rational and uniform ap- 
portionment standards, of all income arising in connection with 
a unitary business. This is the approach adopted in the Uniform 
Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act, which includes all uni- 
tary income within the definition of apportionable business in- 
come, including income from intangibles arising in connection 
with the taxpayer's trade or business operations. Without such 
certainty, taxpayers would be caught in a web of legal abstrac- 
tions. While these abstractions may have served their purposes 
historically, Mobil now dictates a different result for the future. 
70. Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 166 U.S. 185, 223 (1897). 
